Prep Test2 - essay 15

[hwatai]

Essay #15. 561 (23501-!-item-!-188;#058&00561-00)

After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company. Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances. In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead. There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals. Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case. In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers. The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production. As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."

Question #48. 561-01 (23547-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-01)

The passage is primarily concerned with

(A) contrasting the role of unions in the Japanese auto industry with the role of unions in the United States auto industry after the Second World War
(B) describing unionism and the situation of workers in the Japanese auto industry after the Second World War
(C) providing examples of grievances of Japanese auto workers against the auto industry after the Second World War
(D) correcting a misconception about the role of the foreman in the Japanese auto industry's union system after the Second World War
(E) reasserting the traditional view of the company's role in Japanese auto workers' unions after the Second World War

Question #49. 561-02 (23593-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-02)

According to the passage, a foreman in a United States auto company differed from a foreman in a Japanese auto company in that the foreman in the United States would

(A) not have been a member of an auto workers' union
(B) have been unlikely to support the goals of company management
(C) have been able to control production processes to a large extent
(D) have experienced greater stress
(E) have experienced less conflict with workers

Question #50. 561-03 (23639-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-03)

The author of the passage mentions the "OH! NO!" system primarily in order to

(A) indicate a way in which the United States industry has become more like the Japanese auto industry
(B) challenge a particular misconception about worker empowerment in the Japanese auto industry
(C) illustrate the kinds of problem-solving techniques encouraged by company unions in Japan
(D) suggest an effective way of minimizing production costs in auto manufacturing
(E) provide an example of the responsibilities assumed by a foreman in the Japanese auto industry

Question #51. 561-06 (23685-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-06)

It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?

(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.

想請教第50題 , 感恩

[dibert8]

50.
寫作技巧題
OH! NO! = 第二段主旨句的代名詞
What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers.
(A) United States industry 跳段
(C) 沒有提 problem-solving
(D) 不是 suggest
(E) 對象不是 foreman

[小花]

Question #50. 561-03 (23639-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-03)

The author of the passage mentions the "OH! NO!" system primarily in order to

(A) indicate a way in which the United States industry has become more like the Japanese auto industry
段二沒有討論的概念
(B) challenge a particular misconception about worker empowerment in the Japanese auto industry
對了 段二 主題句的換句話說
(C) illustrate the kinds of problem-solving techniques encouraged by company unions in Japan 文中沒有的概念
(D) suggest an effective way of minimizing production costs in auto manufacturing 文中沒有的概念 移花接木
(E) provide an example of the responsibilities assumed by a foreman in the Japanese auto industry
討論的主角不是主管 是員工
定位段二
段二在說明日本模型讓人聯想到扁平組織,員工有充分權力做決定.但實際上真正授權的是主管,而非員工.後面舉出OH! NO例子說明員工如何受支配.

[chris8888]

After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company (日本工會主義是以公司為基礎的, 每一個汽車公司都有個別的公會). Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances. (大部分的公司工會都扮演非獨立的的角色在處理協議的shop floor工人爭議, 或者勸說汽車工人的報怨) In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead.(承上舉例) There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals.(提到角色間沒啥區別, 工會角色 -> 消極的公司目標支持) Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case.(工會裡有衝突) In 1986, however, a caucus(幹部會議) led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation.(86年, 然而, 一項幹部會議迫使工會領袖離開辦公室以及回歸工會的政策到消極的合作其中一項) In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies(在美國, 一間工會代表所有公司的工人, 特別是聯邦法律禁止領班加入或領導產業工會), particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions.(日本的模式被稱為分權給員工授予生產的工人去做出關鍵的決定[舉例 : 豐田式生產]) What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers(一般誤以為的是實際權力的代表團是領班不是工人). The foreman exercised discretion(處理權) over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative(主動權) was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive(不要主動積極), Japanese workers were forced to be reactive(反應式積極), the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control(責任範圍遠大於控制所及的範圍). For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production.(舉例說明, 只給作為生產所需的資源90%) As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."(因為"OH! NO!"系統不斷地推動生產過程到崩潰邊緣, 努力去找出最小的資源需求, 評論者描述他為壓力式管理)

The passage is primarily concerned with 主旨題 :

(A) contrasting the role of unions in the Japanese auto industry with the role of unions in the United States auto industry after the Second World War
對照/對比日本汽車工業工會角色和美國的, 在二戰後. 細節不算是文章主旨
(B) describing unionism and the situation of workers in the Japanese auto industry after the Second World War
描述公會主義和工人在日本汽車工業的局勢, 二戰後. 只有這個最可能是主旨.
(C) providing examples of grievances of Japanese auto workers against the auto industry after the Second World War
提供日本汽車工人反對汽車工業的報怨的例子, 二戰後, 不是文章主旨, 只是略微提及, 算是細節
(D) correcting a misconception about the role of the foreman in the Japanese auto industry's union system after the Second World War
修正錯誤的想法有關領班的角色在日本汽車工業公會系統裡, 二戰後. 不, 沒有錯誤的想法, 這也不是文章主旨.
(E) reasserting the traditional view of the company's role in Japanese auto workers' unions after the Second World War
重複主張在日本汽車工人工會的公司角色的傳統觀點, 在二戰後.

[chris8888]

After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company. Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances. In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead. There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals. Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case. In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly (49-A)since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.
Question #49. 561-02 (23593-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-02)

According to the passage, a foreman in a United States auto company differed from a foreman in a Japanese auto company in that the foreman in the United States would

(A) not have been a member of an auto workers' union
(B) have been unlikely to support the goals of company management
文章沒說
(C) have been able to control production processes to a large extent
文章沒說
(D) have experienced greater stress
文章沒說
(E) have experienced less conflict with workers
文章沒說

[chris8888]

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers.(這些主張所未能去認清的是 .... tone就是說他反駁, 提出不同的看法) The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production. As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."

Question #50. 561-03 (23639-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-03)

The author of the passage mentions the "OH! NO!" system primarily in order to

(A) indicate a way in which the United States industry has become more like the Japanese auto industry
段落不同, 美國的資訊只有在第一段提到領班的事, 初步排除
(B) challenge a particular misconception about worker empowerment in the Japanese auto industry
(C) illustrate the kinds of problem-solving techniques encouraged by company unions in Japan
詳細說明問題解決的技術種類, 日本公司工會鼓勵的, 沒有提到什麼問題解決的種類需要被說明
(D) suggest an effective way of minimizing production costs in auto manufacturing
提出或建議一個有效的方法去最小化生產成本, 在這汽車製造過程裡. No... 沒有提出什麼有效的方法.
(E) provide an example of the responsibilities assumed by a foreman in the Japanese auto industry
跟領班沒有關係

[chris8888]

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor (51-E)empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers. The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; (51-A)worker initiative was limited to suggestions (51-E)that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production. As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to (51-B)find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."

Question #51. 561-06 (23685-!-item-!-188;#058&000561-06)

It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?

(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
不是領班, 是工人, 同時被限制, 不是准許
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
不對, 不是effort, 應該是resource requirement
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
要求最小化的所需資源暗示降低成本.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
不是領班, 是工人, 也不是控制, 只是微調fine-tune
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.
文章不是這樣講, 文章是講做重要決策, 不是完成經理的目標.